I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at Boston University. My research field is Industrial Organization.
You can download my CV here.
Department of Economics
270 Bay State Road, Room 312
Boston, MA 02215
Firms’ Beliefs and Learning: Models, Identification, and Empirical Evidence (with Victor Aguirregabiria), forthcoming in the Review of Industrial Organization
Abstract: This paper reviews recent literature on structural models of oligopoly competition where firms have biased beliefs about primitives of the model (e.g. demand, costs) or about the strategic behavior of other firms in the market. We describe different structural models that have been proposed to study this phenomenon and examine the approaches used to identify firms' beliefs. We discuss empirical results in recent studies and show that accounting for firms' biased beliefs and learning can have important implications on our measures and interpretation of market efficiency.
A Computational Framework for Analyzing Dynamic Auctions: The Market Impact of Information Sharing (with John Asker, Chaim Fershtman, and Ariel Pakes), Revise and Resubmit at the RAND Journal of Economics
NBER Working Paper No. 22836.
Abstract: This paper develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions. We adapt the Experience Based Equilibrium concept to a dynamic auction environment and add, and then operationalize, a boundary consistent condition which mitigates the extent of multiple equilibria that can arise in Experience Based Equilibria. Our example, in which we investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders, shows that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments is important in that it enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. It also shows that the impact of information sharing can depend crucially on the extent of dynamics and suggests that information sharing, even of strategically important data, need not be welfare reducing.
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of uncertainty about the demand process on investment and welfare in container shipping. To capture agent information in a highly volatile environment, I allow agents to be uncertain about the true parameters in the under- lying process for container trade, but form and revise their beliefs using available in- formation. I show that such informational structure generates expectations that are more consistent with expectations about closely-related objects such as overall trade and GDP measured by survey data. Motivated by this finding, I construct and estimate a dynamic oligopoly model of investment that incorporates agent learning about the demand process. Counterfactual analysis reveals that uncertainty about the demand process amplifies investment cycles through (i) leading firms to revise beliefs more drastically as they experience demand fluctuations, and (ii) intensifying strategic in- centives among firms.
Endogenous Information Acquisition and Insurance Choice (with Zach Y. Brown)
Abstract: Insurance contracts are complicated and individuals may choose how much time and effort to spend understanding potential out-of-pocket costs and comparing plans. Building on the rational inattention literature, we develop a parsimonious demand model in which individ- uals choose how much to research difficult to observe characteristics, affecting the accuracy of their beliefs and subsequent choices. The model predicts that individuals acquire more information when the stakes are higher. Using prescription drug insurance data, we exploit within-individual variation in the stakes and show that the model provides an explanation for behavior that is inconsistent with standard demand models. Based on our framework, we estimate an empirical model of insurance demand and find that the marginal cost of acquiring information is higher for older enrollees and those with less prior experience with Medicare Part D plans. Counterfactual analysis sheds light on the welfare losses due to information frictions and how policy makers can restrict plan choice to simplify decision- making and raise welfare. Policies that decrease cost sharing also reduce equilibrium in- formation costs. Overall, we argue that endogenous information acquisition has important implications for counterfactuals and welfare, in addition to supply-side incentives.
Work in Progress
Patient Costs and Physicians’ Information (with Michael J. Dickstein and Eduardo Morales)